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ABSTRACT
An Experimental Evaluation of Smart Toys’ Security and Privacy Practices
Moustafa Mahmoud
Smart toys have captured an increasing share of the toy market, and are growing ubiq-
uitous in households with children. These toys can be considered as a subset of Internet of
Things (IoT) devices, often containing sensors and artificial intelligence capabilities. They
may collect personal information, and frequently have Internet connectivity directly or in-
directly through companion apps. Recent studies have found security flaws in many smart
toys that have led to serious privacy leaks or allowed tracking a child’s physical location.
Some well-publicized discoveries of this nature have led governments around the world to
ban some of these toys.
To complement recent efforts in analyzing and quantifying security and privacy issues
of smart toys, we set out to create two thorough analysis frameworks that are specifically
crafted for smart toys. The first framework is designed to analyze legally-binding privacy
policies and terms-of-use documentation of smart toys. It is based on a set of privacy-
sensitive criteria that we carefully define to systematically evaluate selected privacy aspects
of smart toys. We augment our work with a static analysis for the companion Android apps,
which are, in most cases, essential for intended functioning of the toys. We use our frame-
work to evaluate a representative set of 11 smart toys, along with 11 companion apps. Our
iii
analysis highlights several instances of unnecessary collection of privacy-sensitive infor-
mation, the use of over-privileged apps, incomplete/lack of information about data storage
practices and legal compliance. The proposed framework is a step towards enabling a com-
parison of smart toys from a privacy perspective, which can be useful to parents, regulatory
bodies, and law-makers.
The second framework is used to investigate security and privacy practices - based on
experimental analysis - of those specific kinds of IoT devices. In particular, we inspect the
real practice of smart toys to determine the personal information they collect and security
measures used to protect them. We also investigate potential security and privacy flaws in
smart toys that can lead to leakage of private information, or allow an adversary to control
the toy to lure, harm, or distress a child. Smart toys pose risks unique to this category of
devices, and our work is intended to define these risks and assess a subset of toys against
them. We perform a thorough experimental analysis of five smart toys and their companion
apps. Our systematic analysis has uncovered that several of these toys may expose children
to multiple threats through physical, nearby, or remote access to the toy.
The presented frameworks unite and complement several existing adhoc analyses, and
help comprehensive evaluation of other smart toys.
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Smart toys are gaining popularity in recent times with a rapid growth in sales every year.1
The apparent educational value has led more parents to adopt these toys for their children.
Advances in voice recognition technologies, and the introduction of several hardware sen-
sors have enabled new generations of smart toys to be more intelligent, interactive and
dynamic than their predecessors. On the other hand, these enhanced capabilities allow the
toys to collect a wide array of personal/device information that could be used for profiling
individual children. As many of these toys are also Internet-connected, exposure of the
collected information from the toys, personal devices, back-end servers and third-parties,
can be a serious threat for the security and privacy of children (including the risk of identity
theft; see e.g., [28]).
1According to Juniper Research [79], smart toy sales are expected to grow up to three times in a span of
just five years from 2017 to 2022.
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Recognizing these unique risks to children, governments and regulatory authorities in
different regions are introducing specialized laws/acts, e.g., the US Children’s Online Pri-
vacy Protection Act (COPPA [22]); see also the EU General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR [32]). However, the latitude of privacy concerns for children is getting wider
with the revelation of large scale data breaches and loopholes in security mechanisms
of the these toys. For example, the VTech leak in 2015 [65] and the recent CloudPets
leak in 2017 [48] exposed personal data of nearly six million parents and children; in
both cases, adequate security measures were sorely lacking (see also [68]). My Friend
Cayla has been banned in Germany for its insecure bluetooth connection [70], allowing a
nearby attacker (e.g., up to 15 meters) to interact with children and spy on them. More-
over, the information collection practices in smart toys have also been alarmingly criticized
recently [20, 21, 23, 36, 84].
The lack of easily accessible privacy policies and the inherent complexity of these poli-
cies hinder the parents’ ability to understand potential risks of smart toys and their com-
panion apps for their children. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) also
offers guidelines on how information related to children can be collected. According to
OPC, collection, use and sharing of information about children under 13 years of age, must
be approved by their parents. However, in a recent study [59] parents were found to be
paying no attention to privacy warnings before allowing their children to play with toys
with known security and privacy issues, such as Hello Barbie.
Smart toys are in a position to be continually gathering information about a child, often
accompanying a child wherever they go [60]. Many smart toys have onboard sensors and/or
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actuators, heightening the risks of an exploit [44]. A toy that is continually broadcasting
its presence over Bluetooth provides a means of tracking a child through physical space. A
toy with sensors, like a microphone or camera, can be made to illicitly transmit sensitive
data, like voice or photos, while a toy with actuators, like a motor, can be hijacked to make
the toy behave in unintended and potentially harmful ways. For instance, a toy that can be
made to move in the direction of the attacker can induce a child to follow the toy directly
to the attacker, and a toy with speakers can be made to voice distressing audio [88].
Furthermore, the widespread use of companion apps increases a smart toy’s attack sur-
face. An inadequately secured or overprivileged companion app may be exploited to access
the smartphone’s microphone, camera, or GPS [66], or directly control the toy, and any
communication between the toy and the app, if unencrypted, can be intercepted or modi-
fied. In addition, many apps make use of third-party ads and analytics servers, which pose
their own risks [39]. Children are particularly susceptible to being influenced by advertis-
ing [62], especially as they are often unable to distinguish it from other content [67], and
parents tend to underestimate the effect that online advertising has on their children [24].
Even apps that do not directly advertise to children may collect analytics data on behalf
of third parties, with children more prone to being tracked online than adults [13]. Such
tracking info can be highly intrusive [72], allowing an analytics server to build a strong de-
mographic and behavioral profile of the child [58] that can subsequently be used to display
targeted ads to the child in unrelated apps and websites [31].
3
1.2 Contributions
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
 We propose a comprehensive framework with a set of privacy-sensitive criteria to
evaluate privacy policies and terms of use documents of smart toys. We augment
the framework with static analysis of companion apps that are essential for the toys’
functioning. We evaluate 11 recent smart toys using our framework, and compare
them based on the proposed privacy criteria. The framework apparently captures
the most serious privacy considerations, and can be used to evaluate a diverse set
of smart toys and their companion apps. Using this framework, we show that most
toys collect privacy-sensitive information and share them with third parties for un-
clear purposes. Moreover, companion apps are found to be largely over-privileged,
requesting dangerous permissions that are not necessary, or not used at all.
 We develop an experimental framework for evaluating the security and privacy of
smart toys. The framework encompasses personally identifiable information (PII)
collected and transmitted by smart toys and security measures that have been taken
to protect them, as well as PII collected and transmitted to third parties such as ads
and analytics services, and the third parties’ TLS practices. Our experimental setup
uses network traffic analysis, smartphone app reverse engineering, code analysis,
and Bluetooth analysis. We also present a carefully defined set of attacks relevant
to smart toys, including some that are specific to smart toys. These attacks are cate-
gorized based on attacker proximity to the toy (physical, nearby, or remote access).
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Using this experimental framework, we investigate a representative set of five smart
toys using our experimental setup to expose potential PII leakage, weak security
measures, and other vulnerabilities. By utilizing this experimental framework, we
uncover excessive collection of unique identifiers that facilitate tracking users across
different services or platforms, and sending children’s PII to unauthorized entities.
Our results also show that several toys expose children to physical, nearby, or remote
access threats. We outline a list of best practices smart toys makers can apply to
facilitate better security and privacy protection.
Some of the above contributions have been published in [57].
Responsible Disclosure. As part of responsible disclosure, we shared our results with all
the toy companies as follows. On Nov. 18, 2017, we have shared our results with all the
toy companies in our privacy policies evaluation - through dedicated email addresses for
sharing privacy concerns, when available (for four companies); otherwise, we used general
support emails or web forms (for seven companies). As of the date of submitting this
thesis, Toymail and Sphero have acknowledged the receipt of our report (beyond automated
responses). Two emails bounced back with an invalid email address error.
For the experimental analysis, we have contacted the manufacturers of the five toys
mentioned in this work and shared our findings. Wiggy Piggy Bank has responded quickly
and mentioned that they are looking into the vulnerabilities and possible fixes. Hello Barbie
responded that their technical team may get back to us if they have any concerns. We




The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we first present a brief literature
review of privacy policies analysis in general and for smart toys in particular. After that,
we discuss the security breaches and privacy leakage reported in both the academia and in
the industry. In Chapter 3, we present our comprehensive framework for evaluating privacy
practices of smart toys based on their legally-binding documentation and in Chapter 4, we
present our experimental evaluation framework for smart toys privacy and security prac-
tices. Finally, in Chapter 5, we conclude by presenting recommendations and suggestions
for best privacy and security practices. We also provide some future research directions.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
This chapter covers some necessary background and literature related to this dissertation.
2.1 Background
Smart toys are equipped with sensitive input/output devices including speakers, micro-
phones, cameras, and GPS. Some of these toys have connectivity capabilities including
WiFi and Bluetooth. They can also connect to companion mobile apps. In addition, they
may also collect children and parents personal information including name, address, date
of birth, age, photos, and voice recordings. Smart toys collect these data to present a
personalized experience for the children. However, PII collection can be a problem if im-
proper security measures are applied to protect either the locally stored data or the data
in the cloud. For example, My Friend Cayla can be hacked due to a vulnerability in the
doll software [16] which can lead to personal information leakage. The toy also allows
7
unauthorized Bluetooth connection from any smart phone within 15m from the toy.
In addition, collecting unique identifiers that can uniquely identify children through dif-
ferent services or platforms and sharing these information with third parities can facilitate
children tracking and more alarmingly, if these information are stored or shared insecurely,
could allow adversaries to track children.
Furthermore, privacy policy is the place where smart toys manufacturers indicate pri-
vacy aspects related to their toys. According to COPPA, smart toys manufacturers must
state clearly in the privacy policy children personal information practice. According to
OPC, privacy policy must indicate clearly, and not in a generic way, the privacy practice of
the toy [71].
In fact, the information collection practices in smart toys have been scrutinized recently.
For example, the Campaign for a Commercial-Free Childhood (CCFC) condemned the way
Hello Barbie collects children’s data [36]. The privacy policy of Hello Barbie stated that
they may use the collected data “for other research and development and data analysis
purposes,” without a clearer definition of the scope and extent to which the information
can be used. Such vague explanations about data practices may allow them to use the
collected information for a wide range of purposes (see e.g., [84]). The US Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has conducted several studies (see e.g., [20, 21, 23]) in recent years,
highlighting the lack of disclosure about data practices in mobile apps targeting children
and teens. These FTC reports identified an increased availability of privacy policies: 45%
apps contained direct links to their privacy policies in the latest survey [23] in comparison
to 16-20% in the earliest one [20]; however, ideally, 100% apps should provide a direct
8
privacy policy link.
In this work, we investigate smart toys to determine PII they collect, security measures
they apply, and common vulnerabilities they have. We also analyze legally-binding privacy
policies and terms of use documentation of smart toys to indicate privacy sensitive features
that smart toys manufacturer should take care while they are designing the toys
2.2 Related Work
Below we discuss related work from early research on smart toys security, privacy, and
privacy polices analysis.
2.2.1 Security breaches and privacy leakage
Smart electronics for children have made the news for security breaches since it was first
discovered that strangers could hack baby monitors to view children sleeping and even talk
to them directly [76]. Like wearables for adults, many smart toys are Bluetooth-enabled
and accompany children outside the home, and previous research on fitness trackers has
uncovered numerous vulnerabilities such as location tracking [42]. In 2016, the Norwegian
Consumer Council issued a report [37] highlighting dangerous security vulnerabilities in 3
toys: i-Que, My Friend Cayla, and Hello Barbie, leading Germany to ban Cayla in February
2017 and brand her an “illegal espionage apparatus” [17].
Several security breaches involving the VTech InnoTab MAX, examined in this work,
have been found. Many of the vulnerabilities underlying these attacks have been addressed
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in subsequent years, but others have not. In 2015, VTech’s Learning Lodge database, used
by the VTech suite of children’s tablets, suffered a severe breach, exposing the PII of 6.3
million children’s profiles [49]. The breach was due to a combination of insecure practices.
HTTP traffic was not secured using TLS, and personal information was sent in plaintext.
The database, containing highly personal information, was improperly secured, and vulner-
able to a simple SQL injection attack. Furthermore, account passwords were stored using
an MD5 hash. Following the widespread exposure of this breach, covered in many major
media outlets and drawing extensive scrutiny, VTech brought all affected services offline
pending a security review [89]. Also in 2016, the UK-based security firm Pen Test Part-
ners found that the VTech InnoTab MAX is vulnerable to trivial data extraction [73]. Our
results indicate this flaw has not been fixed. Later in 2016, it was found that pornography
could be easily accessed through the built-in browser by using Google Translate, formerly
whitelisted but since removed by VTech [46]. In February 2016, security firm Rapid7
found severe vulnerabilities in the Fisher Price Smart Monkey, since fixed [77].
Hello Barbie has been extensively scrutinized for its privacy and security practices [34,
47]. Hello Barbie encourages children to divulge intimate details about themselves that do
not remain private, but are shared with Mattel’s partner, ToyTalk, and with parents through
the web portal [52, 85], presenting legal implications in the event that a child discloses
physical or sexual abuse to the toy [64]. A study by Somerset Recon Inc. [82] found that
Hello Barbie was susceptible to a number of vulnerabilities, some fixed in a timely fashion,
but our work finds that others, like broadcasting an open hotspot and allowing unauthorized
configuration during pairing, are still present. Popular brands of children’s smart watches
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have come in for scrutiny by the Norwegian Consumers’ Council, which issued a report
in October 2017 highlighting vulnerabilities in all watches they examined [38]. A month
later, in November 2017, “Which? UK” issued a report examining common Bluetooth vul-
nerabilities in children’s toys that allowed them to be taken over by potentially malevolent
third parties [91]. Given the stakes at risk, the U.S. Senate tabled a report on smart toy se-
curity in December 2016 [69]. The following July, the FBI issued an alert warning parents
against privacy and security concerns regarding smart toys [87].
Denning el al. [29] analyzed the security and privacy of three robots, two of which are
marketed for children: the Erector SpyKee and Wowwee RoboSapien V2. The Spykee
features a camera, mic, and speaker, and is controlled through companion software running
on a PC over WiFi. The study showed login credentials are transmitted in plaintext and
video is streamed unencrypted, allowing even a passive eavesdropper to sniff the login
credentials and control the robot over home WiFi and remotely over the Internet. The
authors also present psychological attacks in which an adversary could coerce the robot to
generate audio that is distressing to children. The severity of an attack can be amplified by
using multiple robots together. The authors manipulated the RoboSapien V2 to move a set
of house keys within another robot’s camera field of view as it streamed video, exposing
the house keys to physical duplication.
Rafferty at al. [75] argue that the traditional access control model is insufficient to pro-
tect the privacy of children using smart toys. They introduce a conceptual model for smart
toys that allows a parent to configure privacy rules and receive notifications about sensitive
data disclosure. The model assumes that children are oblivious to privacy concerns and
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as a result cannot adequately protect themselves online or anticipate the consequences of
leaking private information to smart toy makers and other third parties.
2.2.2 Privacy policies analysis
Natural language privacy policies have long been the standard form of notification to users
about privacy implications of a service. However, their length and complexity put extra
burden on the users’ who rarely read and understand them. Identifying the best format to
represent privacy implications is non-trivial. Earlier work in this domain has largely been
focused on proposing alternatives, or quantifying data practices from legacy privacy poli-
cies. Several studies (e.g., [12, 81]) utilize Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques
to identify important data collection practices from privacy policies. Sadeh et al. [81] lever-
age advances in NLP and machine learning techniques in combination with crowd-sourcing
to extract key privacy information from privacy policies, and then present the policies in a
user-friendly manner.
Costante et al. [25] propose a solution using Information Extraction (IE) techniques to
analyze website privacy policies regarding what data about a visitor is collected. Zimmeck
et al. [95] propose a system to automatically examine compliance of Android apps with
their privacy policies, by performing static analysis of Android apps and extracting privacy
information from their policies. They found that 71% of the apps that do not provide a
privacy policy, but collect at least one PII item, and the ones with privacy policies show
significant inconsistencies between policies and actual app (code) behavior. Our work is
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based on careful manual analysis of available privacy policy and terms of use documenta-
tion as the number of toys/apps we analyze is limited.
Earlier research analyzed privacy policies to infer data practices in more generic cases,
without taking the target user base into consideration. The Explore Privacy Policies project [74]
highlights privacy practices of websites. Hoke et al. [43] study privacy policies of 75 track-
ing companies to examine compliance with self-regulatory guidelines. Costante et al. [26]
assess the completeness of privacy policies by comparing them against a set of privacy
categories. Cranor et al. [27] utilize web crawling and document parsing to analyze model
privacy forms of a large number of financial institutions, and found many instances where
users’ right to control the sharing of information was violated. Various studies focus on
privacy of Android apps in general. Kong et al. [54] propose a system called AUTOREB
that maps reviews of Android apps to security and privacy behaviors. Zhang et al. [94]
attempt to generate security related app description by analyzing the app code.
Another line of work explores the design of user-friendly privacy policy interfaces and
formats that would facilitate users’ understanding of data practices (e.g., [45, 53, 78, 90]).
Kelley et al. [53] develop a solution inspired by nutrition labels that represents the infor-
mation collection practices in a grid view. Holtz et al. [45] propose the use of privacy icons
in addition to the written policies to express data practices in a more effective way.
Several studies have found serious privacy and security issues in connected toys (see
e.g., [30, 83]). Security analysis of Hello Barbie reveals several loopholes in its secu-
rity mechanism [83], including an unencrypted WiFi network used to configure the toy.
McReynolds et al. [59] study the expectations and concerns of both parents and children
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regarding the use of connected smart toys. A report from Future Privacy Forum [40] ex-
plores privacy concerns related to microphone-enabled devices, including smart toys such
as Hello Barbie, and suggests best practices for devices equipped with microphone. Yank-
son et al. [93] discuss privacy implications of connected smart toys and propose some best




Framework for Evaluating Smart Toys’
Privacy Practices
In this chapter, we propose a broad range of criteria to analyze various privacy aspects
of smart toys. In particular, we define a set of privacy-sensitive features as part of our
analysis framework. We evaluate a representative set of 11 smart toys and their companion
apps; Table 1 lists our selected toys and the hardware sensors and communication channels
they are equipped with (for more info on the toys, see Appendix A and Appendix B).
Furthermore, to verify permission usage and identify information collection and potential
misbehaviors, we perform static analysis of the companion apps.
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Table 1: Available sensors and communication channels in our selected smart toys































































Hello Barbie ! ! !
Toymail ! ! !
Sphero BB-8 ! ! ! ! ! !
Wowwee Chip ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Smart Toy Monkey ! ! ! !
CogniToys Dino ! ! ! !
Edwin the Duck ! ! ! !
Anki Cozmo ! ! ! ! !
My Friend Cayla ! ! ! !
I-Que Robot ! ! ! !
Zenbo ! ! ! ! ! ! !
3.1 Evaluation Framework
In this section, we define a diverse set of criteria that we believe are representative of
various privacy aspects in smart toys. The criteria we explore encompass five categories:
application authenticity and permissions; privacy policy documentation; ToU documenta-
tion; information collection; and information storage, sharing and protection. The selected
set of criteria are initially inspired by the data quantification categories of Sadeh et al. [81],
and iteratively refined during our analysis of the smart toys. To augment our analysis of
the available documentation, we perform static analysis of the companion apps. We use the
word feature and criterion interchangeably throughout the rest of the chapter.
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3.1.1 Criteria
In this section, we define the rating criteria of our evaluation framework. For each criterion,
a toy may fully or partially satisfy it, not satisfy it, or may not provide relevant information.
3.1.1.1 Application Authenticity and Permissions
Smart toys are generally accompanied by a companion mobile app, which can be down-
loaded from an app market (e.g., Google Play). Downloading the right app affiliated with
the toy is essential for its intended functioning, and for security and privacy reasons (e.g.,
to avoid downloading a repackaged app with malware/adware/spyware). Moreover, over-
privileged apps can pose privacy risks, as they may request extraneous permissions, which
can be used to access sensitive information. We define the following criteria to cover these
concerns.
A1 App-website-links: The official website of the toy contains a link to download its
companion app from an app market (e.g., Google Play), and the app contains a link to the
official toy website. This bi-directional linking verifies the app’s origin; a toy is partially
granted this feature if one of them is missing.
A2 Reasonable-permissions: The companion app requests only for permissions that are
necessary for its intended functionality. We perform static analysis of the companion apps
together with manual evaluation of provided features to rate this criterion.
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3.1.1.2 Privacy Policy Documentation
Privacy policy communicates data practices of a service. An easily accessible and up to
date privacy policy is essential for communicating privacy implications to parents who are
responsible for permitting the collection of their children’s information.
P1 Store-app-website-links: The companion app, its Google Play page, and the official
website contain a link to the toy privacy policy; partially granted if either of them is missing.
P2 Update-info-notification: Any changes in the privacy policy should be reported to
users. To fully satisfy this feature, the toy must have the date of last update mentioned in
the policy along with explanation of how they report the updates to users; partially granted
if either of them is missing.
3.1.1.3 Terms of Use Documentation
We consider ToU as an important aspect in our framework as it may contain important
privacy practices; we define the following two features.
T1 Store-app-website-links: Similar to P1 (for ToU).
T2 Update-info-notification: Similar to P2 (for ToU).
3.1.1.4 Information Collection
Smart toys can collect a wide range of information during setup/installation (companion
app), or while being used by children. They must comply with privacy acts or laws (spe-
cific to children or in general) of different regions where the toys are sold. We define the
following criteria to highlight data collection practices in smart toys.
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C1 Laws/acts-compliant: The privacy policy of a toy states explicitly the laws/acts they
comply with, and the jurisdiction(s) under which they operate.
C2 Reasonable-PII-collection: The toy and its companion app collects reasonable PII.
We define email address as reasonable PII, assuming email is used to communicate privacy
policy and ToU changes to the user. Any PII beyond email is considered unreasonable.
C3 No-website-data-collection: The toy’s website does not collect any information that
can be used for user tracking or serving personalized ads.
3.1.1.5 Information Storage, Sharing and Protection
Recent data breaches (e.g., [48, 65]) raise questions on secure data storage and protection
practices of smart toys. This is a major concern as one of the leaks ( [65]) contained
information that could lead to identification of individual children and their location. We
define eight features under this category.
S1 Data-storage-location: The location of data storage is stated in the toy’s privacy policy.
Based on their storage location, companies may be subjected to specific regulations in case
of a data breach incident. For example, data breach regulations in US states differ;1 see
also EU e-Privacy Directive2 and GDPR [32].
S2 No-third-party-PII-sharing: Any information collected through the toy is not shared
with third parties.





toy and its companion app.
S4 PII-protection: The measures taken by the toy manufacturer to protect the collected
information is properly documented in the privacy policy or the ToU. Currently, we simply
rate a toy based on its use of TLS for all communications between the toy/user/device and
back-end servers.
S5 Dedicated-privacy-support: The toy manufacturer offers dedicated support for privacy
concerns (e.g., via a specific web page or email address, instead of a generic support con-
tact).
S6 Protection-program-participant: The toy manufacturer participates in independent pro-
grams that provide additional support to users to resolve privacy issues. Such programs may
include Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS [50]) and TRUSTe [86].
S7 Bug-bounty-participant: The toy manufacturer participates in bug bounty programs
that encourage people to identify security and privacy issues in their toys/apps. Such par-
ticipation may indicate a strong commitment towards information security and protection.
S8 Do-not-track-support: The documentation explains how the toy’s website handles Do
Not Track (DNT) requests. A DNT request means the user does not want his browsing data
to be collected and tracked across sessions/devices.
3.1.2 Static Analysis
We use two complementary tools for static analysis: RiskInDroid [61] and Androwarn [56].
We use RiskInDroid to analyze the permission usage of companion apps in order to iden-
tify over-privileges (we limit our app analysis to Android apps only). RiskInDroid uses
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machine learning techniques to quantify risks posed by Android apps, and assigns a risk
value between 0 to 100; higher value indicates higher risks. It uses static analysis to infer
permission utilization in the app code, and categorizes them in four sets. In our analysis of
companion apps, we focus on two sets, namely the declared permissions in the app Mani-
fest, and the permissions that are actually used in the code. This is done by extracting the
API calls from the decompiled source code and mapping them to the required permissions
(using PScout [14]).





















































































































































































































Wowwee Chip N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Smart Toy Monkey N/A N/A
CogniToys Dino N/A
Edwin the Duck N/A
Anki Cozmo N/A
My Friend Cayla N/A N/A N/A
I-Que Robot N/A
Zenbo N/A
= offers the feature; = Partially offers the feature; no circle = does not offer the feature; N/A = information unavailable.
We denote over-privilege as having permissions in the Manifest that are not utilized
in the app code. Such over-privilege does not necessarily imply hidden intents, as there
could be several benign reasons (e.g., developer mistake). Moreover, in newer versions
of Android (6.0 and later), the app will not be granted the dangerous permissions during
installation, rather it would ask for permissions during runtime and the user may choose to
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grant or deny them. However, the app may still ask the users for permissions that they do
not need or use at the moment, but once granted can utilize them in later versions of the
app.
We use another static analysis tool Androwarn [56] to identify potential misbehaviors
and information collection. In contrast to RiskInDroid, Androwarn uses a combination
of structural and data-flow analysis to identify suspicious behaviors including exfiltration
of sensitive information (e.g., device unique identifiers and geolocation via GPS/WiFi),
and abuse of functionality (e.g., making phone calls, sending SMSes, and recording au-
dio/video).
We choose RiskInDroid as it is one of the most recent tools of its kind (published in
2017). In contrast, Androwarn is an open source tool available since 2013 (used in other
app analysis studies). The accuracy of the results of our analysis is tied to the tools we use.
We encountered only one mismatch in outcomes from the tools (for Toymail, RiskInDroid
labels READ_CONTACTS as unused, but Androwarn’s data flow analysis finds its use
for reading the contact list); we acknowledge the fact that using different tools may yield
somewhat different results.
3.2 Analysis and Results
We now use our criteria to evaluate a representative set of 11 smart toys. We manually ex-
amine the privacy policies and ToU documentation to check whether the proposed privacy
criteria are fulfilled by the toys or not (between June 2017 to July 2017, see Table 10 in the
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Appendix for links to the documents). We also statically analyze the companion apps to
identify over-privileged apps, personal/device identifier leakage, and suspicious behaviors.
Below, we elaborate how each toy is rated in our framework; note that, for brevity, we dis-
cuss a feature in the text if it requires some explanation. For a quick summary of our results
and an overall picture, see Table 2 and Section 3.3. Table 3 list permissions declared in the
app Manifests, and Figure 1 shows permission utilization. Tables 4, 5, and 6 summarize
PII collection, device information collection, and toy/app usage collection, respectively.
Hello Barbie. Hello Barbie’s companion app does not satisfy Reasonable-permissions as
it declares seven permissions in the Manifest but uses only four. The unused permissions
include write access to the internal storage and read/write access to the external storage.
Hello Barbie provides Store-app-website-links to the privacy policy, and satisfies Update-
info-notification. It also mentions that in some cases, it obtains the user’s prior verifiable
approval before updating the policy (no explicit mention of approval mechanisms).
Hello Barbie is Legal-compliant with COPPA. It does not satisfy Reasonable-PII-collection:
from the user, it collects email address, voice recordings, and child birthday (Table 4); from
the device, it collects device model and name, IP address, operating system, browser type,
mobile network information (Table 5). It also collects service usage information including
information about how the app features and speech processing services are used, and infor-
mation about the number, frequency and length of each session (Table 6). In addition, the
toy does not satisfy No-website-data-collection as it sets cookies and web beacons.
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Hello Barbie does not satisfy No-third-party-PII-sharing as it shares personal informa-
tion with vendors, consultants, and other service providers. Hello Barbie provides Parental-
PII-control through the parent’s account. The toy also provides PII-protection through se-
cure encrypted data transmission (TLS). In addition, the child’s voice recordings are not
stored locally on the toy (WiFi credentials are stored). However, a recent study [83] shows
that Hello Barbie suffers from many vulnerabilities including using weak passwords, no
password brute force protection, using unencrypted WiFi network to configure the toy, and
not requiring unique authentication to modify the configuration of the toy. As our analysis
is based on the information obtained from the documentation, we grant PII-protection to
Hello Barbie. We follow the same principle for other toys, assuming any reported vulnera-
bilities will be promptly fixed.
Hello Barbie is Protection-program-participant: the user can directly submit a com-
plaint to JAMS to resolve a dispute. In addition, Hello Barbie states that its server, ToyTalk,
is subject to the investigatory and enforcement powers of the US FTC. It is Bug-bounty-
participant according to HackerOne [41]; however, Hello Barbie mentions in the ToU doc-
ument that attempts of reverse engineering, decompiling, or discovering the source code
are disallowed. The toy does not clearly state the Data-storage-location: it states that the
location can be in the USA or other countries.
Toymail. Toymail does not satisfy Reasonable-permissions as it declares 14 permissions in
the Manifest but does not use six, including get accounts, access the camera and read/write
external storage. In addition, our static analysis shows that the companion app can abuse



































Figure 1: Permissions requested (used vs. unused) by the companion apps
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Hello Barbie ! ! ! !
Toymail ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Sphero BB-8 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Wowwee Chip ! ! ! ! ! !
Smart Toy Monkey ! ! ! ! ! !
CogniToys Dino ! ! ! !
Edwin the Duck ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Anki Cozmo ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
My Friend Cayla ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
I-Que Robot ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Zenbo ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
contacts.
Toymail partially satisfies Store-app-website-links (P1); it includes some privacy in-
formation in the ToU document, including collection of personal information (e.g., voice
recordings), service usage information, and sharing policy of personal information. It also
partially satisfies Update-info-notification (P2) since it fails to notify the user with any up-
date details to the privacy policy, although it indicates the update date (similar rating for
ToU T2).
Toymail is Legal-compliant with COPPA, and the federal courts in Michigan have ex-
clusive jurisdiction. It does not satisfy Reasonable-PII-collection as it collects email ad-
dress, child’s name, image, and birthday, time zone, sound bite of the child’s name (see
Tables 4, 5, and 6). Moreover, our data flow analysis for the companion app reveals that it
also collects the unique device ID that can be used to fingerprint the user’s device and can
allow tracking the user across different services [55]. In addition, it collects information
from users when they use the toy’s website, including IP address, browser type and version,
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Hello Barbie ! ! !
Toymail ! ! ! !
Sphero BB-8 ! ! ! ! ! !
Smart Toy Monkey ! ! ! ! !
CogniToys Dino ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Edwin the Duck ! ! ! ! !
My Friend Cayla ! ! ! ! !
I-Que Robot ! ! ! ! !
Zenbo ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
and cookies. It also uses Google analytics service, hence it does not satisfy No-website-
data-collection.
Toymail does not satisfy Data-storage-location as it states that data can be stored in the
USA or other countries. It does not satisfy No-third-party-PII-sharing as it shares personal
information with “Electric Imp”, service technicians, other Toymail employees, and pro-
vides users’ personal information in case of a law or court order, or if third-party entities
audit its system for security vulnerabilities. Toymail satisfies PII-protection (uses TLS). It
uses Amazon cloud service to store personal data, and thus it depends on Amazon’s security
measures to prevent the unauthorized access to its data. Toymail also performs automated
deployments and security upgrades, and it uses independent third-party services to audit
the system for security vulnerabilities. It is not Bug-bounty-participant and prohibits any
attempts for reverse engineering, decompiling, or discovering the source code.
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Hello Barbie  ! ! ! ! ! 
Toymail  ! ! 
Sphero BB-8  !  ! ! ! ! !
Wowwee Chip  
Smart Toy Monkey ! ! ! ! 
CogniToys Dino   
Edwin the Duck ! ! ! ! !  
Anki Cozmo  
My Friend Cayla !   
I-Que Robot !  
Zenbo ! ! ! !  ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! refers to information collected by the companion apps as declared in the privacy policy
 refers to information collected by the companion apps but not declared in the privacy policy
blank means no information is collected
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Sphero BB-8. Sphero BB-8 does not satisfy Reasonable-permissions as it declares 18 per-
missions but uses 13. It requires location access, which is not necessary for the toy; it re-
quires access to device status and identity, allowing it to collect user’s personal information
including phone number and device ID. Moreover, the static analysis for the companion
app reveals that it can make phone calls without the user’s consent.
Sphero BB-8 partially satisfies Update-info-notification for ToU (T2) as the toy only
notifies users with ‘important’ changes in the ToU without defining what is considered as
important.
Sphero BB-8 is Legal-compliant with EU safe harbor agreement [33], which is an
agreement between the European Union and USA to protect user information; it is also
governed by the laws and courts of Colorado (USA). On the other hand, Sphero BB-8 does
not satisfy Reasonable-PII-collection as the toy collects excessive information from users;
see Tables 4, 5, and 6. Moreover, our static analysis reveals that the toy also collects the
unique device ID. Sphero BB-8 does not satisfy No-website-data-collection as it gathers
information including browser/OS type, IP addresses, referring URL, date/time stamps for
the visits, cookies, web beacons. It also indicates that third parities including advertisers,
ad measurement services, and ad networks may collect device information and information
about the users’ online activities over time and across different websites.
Sphero BB-8 does not satisfy Data-storage-location as it may store the information
in the USA or any other country. It lacks No-third-party-PII-sharing: it shares personal
information with third-party services who may work for the company, and in the case of
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corporate restructuring or court order. The toy lacks Parental-PII-control as it does not pro-
vide an explicit facility for PII-deletion, though it provides an email address, which parents
can use to contact the company for deleting personal information; however, it mentions that
the information will be deleted from their active server but not from the archive servers. It
provides PII-protection as it uses encrypted traffic and it hires third-party security experts
to audit the network infrastructure. It partially provides Do-not-track-support feature be-
cause Sphero BB-8 discusses about DNT in their documentation but acknowledges that
they may not be able to recognize such requests.
Wowwee Chip. Wowwee Chip lacks Reasonable-permissions as only three out of the
six requested permissions are used. Wowwee Chip partially provides Store-app-website-
links (P1) to the privacy policy as there is no link from Google Play to the privacy policy.
Wowwee Chip does not provide ToU document, hence Store-app-website-links (T1) and
Update-info-notification (T2) features are inapplicable.
Wowwee Chip is Legal-compliant with COPPA. It collects personal information from
users when they sign up for email newsletters, or register a product; however, Wowwee
Chip does not mention exactly which personal information it collects. Our static analy-
sis reveals that the companion app collects the unique device ID, and thus not satisfying
Reasonable-PII-collection. Wowwee Chip sets cookies through its website, hence it does
not satisfy No-website-data-collection.
Wowwee Chip fails to achieve all the features of Information Storage, Sharing and
Protection except Parental-PII-control (partial). Wowwee Chip mentions that users can
delete their accounts, though it does not mention whether or not the personal information
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Hello Barbie ! ! !
Toymail ! !
Sphero BB-8 ! ! ! !
Smart Toy Monkey ! ! !
My Friend Cayla ! !
I-Que Robot ! !
Zenbo ! ! ! !
will be permanently deleted.
Smart Toy Monkey. Smart Toy Monkey lacks Reasonable-permissions as it requests lo-
cation permission in the Manifest, which remains unused in the app. It partially satisfies
Update-info-notification (P1) as it does not include the last update date in the privacy policy,
and states that it may notify users about important changes. Smart Toy Monkey partially
satisfies Store-app-website-links (T1) for ToU because in Google Play, Smart Toy Monkey
mistakenly names the ToU as privacy policy, which can mislead users, although it provides
a direct link to the ToU in the companion app and the website. It also partially achieves
Update-info-notification (T2) because it does not indicate the last update date in the ToU
(but notifies users).
Smart Toy Monkey is Legal-compliant with US laws, implying COPPA compliance.
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It lacks Reasonable-PII-collection as it collects unique device ID (revealed by the static
analysis). Smart Toy Monkey also states that it optionally collects names, email, telephone
number, demographic and other personal information. It does not satisfy No-website-data-
collection (uses cookies and web beacons).
Smart Toy Monkey does not provide No-third-party-PII-sharing: it may use third par-
ties to provide analytics and advertising services, implying that it can share personal in-
formation with them. It does not clearly state the Data-storage-location as it may store
information in the USA or any other country. It is not Bug-bounty-participant and it states
clearly that it prohibits any attempts for reverse engineering, decompiling, or discovering
the source code.
CogniToys Dino. CogniToys Dino partially achieves App-Website-links, as it does not
provide a link from website to the app. It lacks Reasonable-permissions as the compan-
ion app requires location access permission (also another unused permission). CogniToys
Dino partially satisfies Store-app-website-links (P1) as it has no direct link to the privacy
policy from the Google Playpage; the policy is reachable through its app interface. It par-
tially satisfies Update-info-notification (P2) because it does not notify users with updates
in the privacy policy. For ToU, CogniToys Dino partially provides Update-info-notification
(T2) because it states that users must check back the ToU for any changes, implying that
CogniToys Dino does not notify the user with changes.
CogniToys Dino is Legal-compliant with US laws, implying COPPA compliance. It
lacks Reasonable-PII-collection as it collects name, address, mobile phone number, email
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address, payment information, and child’s name, date of birth, and gender. Static anal-
ysis reveals that the companion app also collects unique device ID. It does not satisfy
No-website-data-collection as it collects information about web browser, OS, ISP, IP ad-
dresses, device type, viewed pages, the time and duration of visits to the site, and it sets
cookies uses Google Analytics services.
CogniToys Dino lacks Data-storage-location: it can store user information in the USA
or any other country. It does not satisfy No-third-party-PII-sharing because it shares in-
formation with third-party service providers who work for the company. It also shares
personal information in case of corporate restructuring, or in case of a law or court order.
We rate CogniToys Dino as partially providing PII-protection since it does not mention ex-
actly which kind of measures it takes to protect data, although CogniToys Dino states that
it takes physical, electronic, and procedural safeguards to protect the information. It is not
a Bug-bounty-participant, and prohibits any attempts for reverse engineering, decompiling,
or discovering the source code.
Edwin the Duck. Edwin the Duck is labeled as partially satisfying App-website-links as
its companion app contains a link to its official website but the link from the website to its
Google Play page is missing. Static analysis of the app reveals two unused permissions
(read/write external storage), making it over-privileged and not satisfying Reasonable-
permissions. In spite of containing links to the privacy policy from its website, companion
app and Google Play page, Edwin the Duck is partially granted Store-app-website-links
(P1) as the later two link to different documents. Update-info-notification (P2) is partially
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satisfied as both versions of the privacy policy state the last date of update but fail to men-
tion whether they will keep the users updated with any changes in the policy. For ToU, it
lacks Update-info-notification (T2).
Edwin the Duck does not satisfy Reasonable-PII-collection because it collects name,
address, email address, type of device, device unique ID, IP address, OS, and browser
information. It does not satisfy No-website-data-collection as it sets cookies, and collects
name, email address, mailing address, phone number, and credit card information.
Edwin the Duck lacks No-third-party-PII-sharing as it shares information with third-
parties who assist the company in operating and developing the service. It states that non-
personally identifiable visitor information may be provided to other parties for marketing,
advertising, or for other uses. We rate Edwin the Duck as providing Parental-PII-control as
it allows parents to delete PII by contacting the company through “Contact us” link in the
website. It partially provides PII-protection: Edwin the Duck mentions that all sensitive
information is transmitted over SSL (but does not clarify what is considered as sensitive,
except credit card numbers); at the server-side, Edwin the Duck does not store a user’s
private information such as credit card and financial information. Edwin the Duck is not
Bug-bounty-participant, and it prohibits any attempts for reverse engineering, decompiling,
or discovering the source code.
Anki Cozmo. Anki Cozmo partly achieves App-website-links as the link to the Google
Play page of the companion app from its website is unavailable. It lacks Reasonable-
permissions: the app uses 7 out of 16 requested permissions. The unused permissions
include read/write access to the external storage of the device, access to bluetooth settings.
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We grant the toy a partial Store-app-website-links as the ToU is unavailable in its Google
Play page. The toy is granted a partial Update-info-notification as there is no mention of
how they will report updates in ToU to users. Reasonable-PII-collection is not granted
as there is no clear explanation of what data they collect from users. No-third-party-PII-
sharing is not granted as it shares collected information with third party ad networks. The
toy achieves Protection-program-participant as users can contact TRUSTe [86] and JAMS
in case of a dispute.
My Friend Cayla. My Friend Cayla fails to satisfy Reasonable-permissions: 5 out of 13
requested permissions are unused, including read/write access to external storage. More-
over, static analysis shows that the app can make phone calls without users’ consent. We
could not find a link to the privacy policy from the app, therefore, granting a partial Store-
app-website-links. There is no mention of how it will notify users of any policy changes,
although, it contains the last date of update in the privacy policy, thus partially fulfilling
Update-info-notification (P2).
The toy does not offer Reasonable-PII-collection as it collects IP address, zip code, date
of birth and voice messages. Furthermore, the static analysis for the companion app shows
that it collects the unique device ID. The toy fails to satisfy No-third-party-PII-sharing as
it shares data with partner organizations. It lacks Parental-PII-control as according to its
privacy policy, there is some information that cannot be removed completely.
I-Que Robot. I-Que Robot does not satisfy Reasonable-permissions as four out of thirteen
declared permissions remain unused, including write access to the external storage. Data
flow analysis for the app also shows that it can make phone calls. Although the last date of
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update is mentioned, there is no specific statement in the privacy policy on notifying users
about changes in the document, thus partly satisfying Update-info-notification (P2); it is
similarly rated for T2 (ToU). I-Que Robot collects the same PII as My Friend Cayla, and
thus lacks Reasonable-PII-collection. The toy shares information with other parties and
fails to satisfy No-third-party-PII-sharing. The toy uses firewalls and secure databases to
achieve PII-protection.
Zenbo. Zenbo is partially granted App-website-links as the official website does not contain
any link to the companion app’s Google Play page. The app is also highly over-privileged;
it requests 27 permissions, but uses only 15 (unused permissions include: flashlight, record-
ing audio, using camera and modifying system settings). The app requires the permission
to retrieve running apps information and to manage accounts on the device. Static analysis
also reveals that the companion app can be involved in telephony service abuse by making
phone calls without users’ consent. Thus Zenbo is not granted Reasonable-permissions.
The toy partially achieves Store-app-website-links because its Google Play page pro-
vides a link to the Mandarin version of the privacy policy and there is no way to switch to
the English version, though the website and the app provide links to the English version.
The toy is also partially granted Update-info-notification: it will notify users if there is
any important/big update in the policy. Update-info-notification is achieved partly as the
procedure of notifying users is not mentioned. We do not grant Reasonable-PII-collection:
it collects a wide range of PII including name, email, gender and date of birth, if the user
decides to login using social media profiles; otherwise, it only requires email address and
country.
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3.3 Summary of Results
None of the toy companion apps achieve Reasonable-permissions. Our static analysis re-
veals different levels of over-privileges (i.e., more permissions declared in the Manifest
than the app needed or used). For example, Smart Toy Monkey and CogniToys Dino de-
clare only one unused permission, but Zenbo has 12 unused permissions. Among the de-
clared and used permissions, there are multiple instances where the requested permissions
are not necessary for the toys’ intended functioning. For example, Sphero BB-8 requires
access to the approximate location; Zenbo requests permissions to allow managing users’
accounts on the device. Static analysis also shows that some toys may perform unwant-
ed/suspicious activities surreptitiously. For example, My friend Cayla, I-Que Robot, and
Zenbo companion apps can make phone calls without user consent.
Most toys perform poorly in Information Collection features. All except Anki Cozmo
collect PII that appear unreasonable, and Anki Cozmo fails to declare which PII it col-
lects. Collected PII includes: email address, voice recordings, address, phone number,
child’s name, image and birthday; device information including device model and name,
IP address, OS/browser version, and mobile network information. Collected service usage
information includes: information about how the features of the app and speech processing
services are used, and information about the number, frequency and length of each session.
Moreover, static analysis reveals that some toys may collect personal information that is
not mentioned in their privacy policies. For example, Toymail, Sphero BB-8, Wowwee
Chip, CogniToys Dino companion apps collect the unique device ID (e.g., IMEI) that can
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be used to fingerprint the user’s device and can allow tracking the user across different ser-
vices. All the toys fail to achieve No-website-data-collection as they at least set cookies
and web beacons (which can be used for tracking and serving targeted ads; see e.g., [19]).
Except Wowwee Chip all the toys share PII with third parties. Hello Barbie, Toy-
mail, Smart Toy Monkey, CogniToys Dino, Edwin the Duck, and Anki Cozmo provide full
Parental-PII-control. Seven toys claim to take security measures for PII-protection, two
toys do not state exactly which measures they take to protect PII, and two others do not
provide any information. Four toys provide a dedicated webform/email address to contact
the company in case of any privacy concern about their toys; two of those are Protection-
program-participant in TRUSTe or JAMS. Hello Barbie is the only toy that is Bug-bounty-
participant, which may help discover security and privacy flaws in the toy. None of the
toys’ websites (except Sphero BB-8 partially) respect DNT.
Responsible Disclosure. As part of responsible disclosure, we shared our results with all
the toy companies as follows. On Nov. 18, 2017, we have shared our results with all the
toy companies in our privacy policies evaluation - through dedicated email addresses for
sharing privacy concerns, when available (for four companies); otherwise, we used general
support emails or web forms (for seven companies). As of Nov. 29, 2017, Toymail and
Sphero have acknowledged the receipt of our report (beyond automated responses). Two
emails bounced back with an invalid email address error.
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3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present a comprehensive framework for evaluating privacy practices of
smart toys – to help us better understand their policies and to be able to compare them.
We use our framework to analyze a representative set of 11 smart toys and their compan-
ion apps. We believe it can help evaluate other smart toys in the market (with possible
extension and refinement). We found several issues in the privacy practices of these smart
toys, especially in regards to PII collection, third-party data sharing, web tracking, and data
storage location. We augment our policy analysis by statically analyzing the toys’ com-
panion apps to determine over-privileges, sensitive PII collection and suspicious behaviors.
We found that all the companion apps are over-privileged and collect unnecessary personal
information. Our static analysis provides evidence of potential suspicious activities of the
companion apps, such as abusing the telephony service. We believe that our framework
can facilitate quick and effective comparison of smart toys privacy practices in future, and
be useful to parents, law-makers and toy manufacturers.
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Chapter 4
Experimental Evaluation of Privacy and
Security Practices in Smart Toys
While in chapter 3, we analyze legally-binding privacy policies and terms of use documen-
tation of smart toys to find privacy sensitive features that smart toys manufacturer should
take care while they are designing the toys, in this chapter, we set out to investigate the real
security and privacy practices of those smart toys. Here, we inspect the actual practice of
the toy by putting it under examination in our carefully-built experimental setup to detect
the exact PII the toy or the third parity ads and analytics services collect. In chapter 3, we
concluded that smart toys manufacturers should state in the legal documentation the secu-
rity measures smart toys use to protect collected PII. Here, we scrutinize the real security
practice of those smart toys. In addition, in this chapter, we rigorously inspect smart toys
against especially-prepared list of vulnerabilities that we believe smart toys can be vulner-
able to. We categorized those vulnerabilities according to the attacker proximity to the toy
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- namely physical, nearby, or remote access.
To summarize, in this chapter, we introduce an experimental framework that we use
to systematically analyze a representative subset of smart toys to determine the personal
information they collect and security measures used to protect them. We also investigate
potential security and privacy flaws in smart toys that can lead to leakage of private in-
formation, or allow an adversary to control the toy to lure, harm, or distress a child. In
particular, we consider two broad categories of risk: breach of Personally Identifiable In-
formation (PII) and unauthorized control of the toy.
4.1 Analysis framework
Most smart toys we analyze are intended to be used with companion apps running on smart-
phones or tablets. All the mobile apps we examine, and many of the toys, communicate
with remote hosts. This presents a wide attack surface covering toy, app, hosts, and the
communication between each pair of these. We consider each component - toy, app, and
hosts - as forming a dyad with each other component, and each dyad as a possible attack
vector. For example, a toy establishes a connection with its associated mobile compan-
ion app, usually over either Bluetooth or 802.11, and if the toy can be configured to have
Internet connectivity, it likewise may establish an Internet connection with one or more
web-based hosts. The toy, the app, and the hosts are all attack vectors in this scenario, and
so too are the connections formed between the toy and its companion app, as well as the
toy and its hosts, as depicted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Smart toy attack surface
4.1.1 Investigating PII Collected and Transmitted
PII can be divided into three categories: personal information including name, gender,
physical address, email address, telephone number, voice recordings, and photos; device
information, including mobile device unique identifiers like IMEI, serial number, MAC
address, IP address, and smart toy ID; and service usage information including session
start and end time, session duration, and app features. Toys that require the user to create
an account typically collect and store more PII than toys that do not. We audit the network
traffic of smart toys and their companion apps to determine the PII they collect, transmit,
and share with toy servers and third parties, and whether those third parties are ads or
analytics servers.
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4.1.2 Examining Security Measures
Our framework aims to evaluate what types of data are collected by the toy and its com-
panion apps, and the security measures that have been taken to protect them. Data can be
PII, in which case measures must be taken to protect its confidentiality, or it can be non-
confidential content shown in the UI, like toy name and images, which must be protected
from tampering.
Data is at risk of exposure when in transit and in storage. For a smart toy, transit of
data, including PII, can occur between the toy and a companion app, a companion app and
a remote server, or, for toys with Internet connectivity, the toy itself and a remote server.
Additionally, data may be stored locally on the toy or on the device hosting the companion
app. To investigate the confidentiality and integrity of data, we assess the security of com-
munications channels between each pair of endpoints and local data storage mechanisms.
We determine the protocols used to communicate with remote hosts, and whether they
are encrypted, for instance using TLS, and assess the likelihood and severity of active
attacks, from replacing user interface elements in the app with inappropriate content to
remotely controlling a toy.
4.1.3 Potential Vulnerabilities
We define a list of potential vulnerabilities and assess the smart toys against them. These
vulnerabilities are grouped by the proximity required to exploit them, whether physical,
nearby, or remote access.
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Physical access. The following vulnerabilities can be exploited by an adversary with phys-
ical access to the toy.
No-local-PII-protection. An adversary with physical access to the toy can retrieve PII
stored locally in the toy flash or by the companion app, leaving it unprotected in the event
the toy is lost, stolen, or when sold unsanitized.
Unauthorized-config-physical. An adversary with physical access to the toy can configure
it to maliciously forward PII to their account or issue harmful commands to the child.
Nearby access. These vulnerabilities require an attacker to be within close proximity to
the toy, for instance within WiFi or Bluetooth range.
Unauthorized-use. This vulnerability allows an attacker to use the toy, for instance to
remotely control it.
Unauthorized-config-nearby. A nearby attacker can download the companion app, connect
to the toy, and maliciously configure it.
Unencrypted-hotspot. Some toys can toggle their WiFi adapter into access point mode to al-
low a companion app to connect directly to the toy and configure it. A toy’s hotspot should
authenticate devices that attempt to connect, and force transmission of data over an en-
crypted channel. Otherwise, an adversary who connects to a toy’s open hotspot can launch
a MitM attack and sniff the communication to retrieve personal information in plaintext or
maliciously configure the toy.
Insecure-Bluetooth-practice. Using public, static Bluetooth MAC addresses allows a toy,
and the child using it, to be tracked persistently [42]. In addition, accepting unauthorized
Bluetooth connections to the toy allows adversaries to connect to the toy and change its
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behavior, or launch a MitM attack to sniff information transmitted between the toy and
the app [4]. Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) privacy resolves these two problems by MAC
addresses randomization and whitelisting [35].
Always-on. Toys that do not have power switches and include sensitive sensors or are
connected to the Internet increase their exposure to potential attack, for instance by contin-
uously broadcasting a static MAC address.
Remote access. The following vulnerabilities expose the toy to remote attacks.
Online-password-bruteforce. Some toys allow Web login to the parent account. Login
pages that allow unlimited number of password trials could allow an adversary to brute
force passwords, particularly if they are weak.
No-remote-PII-protection. This vulnerability allows adversaries to access PII remotely,
putting confidential data at risk.
Weak-parental-PII-control. Some toys do not allow parents to review or delete PII collected
from their children, such as voice recordings or pictures.
Exposure-to-vulnerable-third-parties. Third parties with whom PII is shared, such as ads
and anaytics server, may have inadequate measures to protect collected data.
Unencrypted-comm-channels. Information exchange between different parties (toy, app,
and hosts) may be susceptible to interception through a MitM attack if it is not conducted
over encrypted channels, such as TLS.
Insecure-session-cookies. Session cookies are used to automatically log users in to their
accounts. If they are not adequately secured, for instance if they do not expire or the secure
flag is not set, an adversary may gain unauthorized access to the parent account and to the
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child’s profile.
Insecure-TLS-practices. TLS vulnerabilities [92] may result from using weak cipher suites,
old TLS versions such as SSL 3.0, and vulnerable extensions. We examine servers con-
tacted by the toy against protocol vulnerabilities such as POODLE, CRIME, Heartbleed,
and Ticketbleed [80], and assess server certificates for security issues, including using short
cryptographic keys and certificate mismatch.
URL-redirect. Web servers that are not hardened against a URL redirect vulnerability could
allow an adversary using social engineering techniques to redirect users to phishing web-
sites to steal their credentials. An adversary could send links to users that appear legitimate
(for instance, containing the correct domain name), but that use special characters to redi-
rect the user to another, malicious domain. Servers should prevent URL redirect, or at least
whitelist accepted URLs.
4.2 Methodology and Experimental Setup
Our framework for smart toys and companion apps combines our own mechanisms with
tests performed through existing test suites. Using this framework, we analyze five well-
known smart toys, described in Appendix A, their companion apps, and the remote servers
they communicate with against potential vulnerabilities. To obtain data for our analysis,
we systematically run the toys through typical use case scenarios, using real mobile de-
vices to circumvent evasion techniques apps may use to avoid detection of suspicious ac-
tivity. Existing app analysis tools are used to detect the servers the toys communicate with,
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the PII they transmit, and the security measures applied by toy makers to protect personal
information. We augment these wherever suitable by applying reverse engineering mecha-
nisms, network traffic analysis, retrieval of certificate private keys, and leaking protection
passphrases.
4.2.1 Hardware Setup
Our experimental setup uses a PC hosting Windows 10 professional 64-bit. The PC is
configured to use a MediaTek 802.11G WiFi adapter in access point mode, using the 2.4
GHz frequency band (the band used by the toys we examine), and a second NIC with
Internet connectivity. We examine the companion apps using a Samsung N7100 hosting
Android 4.4.2. This version of Android is ranked among the top four Android versions
used in the wild [11]. As an older version of Android, it is illustrative of how toys deal with
older cipher suites, TLS versions and TLS protocol vulnerabilities.
4.2.2 Network Analysis
Our experimental setup uses Wireshark [9] to sniff network traffic initiated by the toys and
their companion apps. We configure a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) proxy to intercept TLS
traffic to and from the companion app and, wherever applicable and/or possible, the toy
itself. This entails installing a certificate to the mobile device’s trusted store corresponding
to the MitM proxy used, ensuring that the smartphone accepts certificates signed by the
corresponding private key. In lieu of establishing a TLS connection between the device and
the remote server, two TLS connections are formed instead: one between the end device
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and the proxy using the installed certificate, and another between the proxy and the remote
server. In this configuration, the proxy acts a server to the end device, and a client to the
remote server. To decrypt traffic, we use Burp Suite [5] as a MitM proxy and adds the
Burp Suite CA certificate to the smartphone CA store. We address special cases where
this approach was insufficient to intercept and decrypt TLS communications. All such
interventions were performed on Android-based client apps that were reverse-engineered.
The Qualys SSL Labs [6] testing suite was used to perform TLS analysis on the server side,
and we examined packet captures in Wireshark to analyze TLS practices on the client app.
4.2.3 Ads and Analytics Analysis
Wherever possible, we intercept data between the companion app and third party ads and
analytics servers (Internet-capable toys we examined do not communicate with ads and
analytics services). We investigate the analytics servers to detect any instances of unique
identifiers correlation with the users’ personal information such as email address. We also
inspect usage of cross-platform cookies such as DSID and IDE [7] cookies which are used
to distinguish users across different platforms.
4.2.4 App Analysis
All companion apps were analyzed manually (as opposed to using, for example, the Mon-
key automation tool [8]). We mimicked common use case scenarios with the goal of trig-
gering app UI events looking for signs of PII leakage, weak security measures, or potential
vulnerabilities, and captured data from the interaction with the toy and its companion app.
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Modify custom CA store. When the companion app uses a custom CA store to verify
server certificates, we apply the following methodology to force the app to accept the MitM
certificate: (a) Decompile the app using Apktool [2] to retrieve the CA store from the
app’s assets directory, (b) Patch parts of the app smali files to force revealing the CA store
password, (c) Use the password to access and update the custom CA store, (d) Use the
keystore explorer tool to add the MitM certificate, and (e) Replace the CA store in the
assets directory of the app with the new store, rebuild the app using Apktool, re-sign and
verify the patched apk file, and use the adb tool to reinstall it. As a result, the app accepts
the MitM certificate.
Exfiltrate client SSL certificate. In cases where the companion app authenticates to the
server using a client Bouncy Castle file (PKCS#12), which encompasses the client’s public
key and the client’s private key, we reverse engineer the app to exfiltrate the PKCS#12 file
and the passphrase used to protect it. We then add the PKCS#12 file (the certificate and the
private key) to the interception proxy. This allows the interception proxy to authenticate to
the server.
Bypass certificate pinning. In cases where the companion app uses certificate pinning to
refuse server certificates signed by any CA other than the one with the pinned certificate in
the app, we patch the corresponding parts of the app smali files to disable this feature and
intercept the communication.
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4.2.5 TLS Vulnerabilities Analysis
We assess toys, apps and server SSL practice to determine potential TLS protocol vulnera-
bilities, and use Qualys SSL Labs to determine TLS server parameters, including supported
TLS versions, cipher suites and extensions.
4.2.6 Bluetooth Analysis
BLEscanner [3] is used to examine the Bluetooth connection between the toy and the
companion app, and determine whether the toy’s Bluetooth MAC address is persistent or
dynamically changing. We investigate how an adversary could tamper with the commu-
nication or gain unauthorized access to Bluetooth parameters to conduct MitM or other
attacks [51].
4.3 Results
All toys we examined collected PII, and most of them communicated with one or more ad
and analytics servers. Alarmingly, the toys geared towards younger children collected PII
more aggressively and in general secured it more poorly, while toys geared for older chil-
dren collected less PII, generally did not require account creation, and had more thoughtful
security measures in place to protect them. Toys geared to younger children collected more
intrusive PII, such as cross-service and cross-platform unique identifiers and user and de-
vices fingerprinting information, and collected it more frequently.
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Toymail ! ! !
Wiggy Piggy Bank ! !
Hello Barbie ! !
Wowwee Chip ! !
Cloudpets ! ! !
Table 7 shows the persistent user identifiers collected by the smart toys and their com-
panion apps. Some identifiers captured in the transmissions were obfuscated, or their pur-
pose was not clear. In these cases, we have made conservative assumptions about their
purpose; if they appear across multiple sessions, like an app ID, then they are deemed to
track the user across multiple sessions of the same app. All the Android apps we tested
transmit the Google advertising identifier, even when ad tracking is disabled in the smart-
phone. These apps, and those that transmit a hardware identifier, are deemed to track users
across multiple services on the same device. Finally, apps that use cookies such as DSID
and IDE on Android [7], or transmit email addresses or other identifying information about
the user to analytics servers, are deemed to track users across multiple platforms.
Table 8 shows the ads and analytics servers contacted by toys and companion apps.
Four out of five toys we examined send data to two or more analytics servers. The set
of toys we examined are vulnerable to some form of attack, whether through physical or
nearby access (within WiFi or Bluetooth coverage), or remotely, such as over HTTP, as
shown in Table 9. In the following subsections, we discuss our findings.
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Toymail ! ! ! !
Wiggy Piggy Bank ! !
Wowwee Chip ! !
Cloudpets ! ! ! !
4.3.1 Toymail
PII collected and transmitted. The companion app sends PII to app.toymailco.com in-
cluding login credentials, email address, parent profile ID, child name, child date of birth,
child photo, friends profiles IDs and names, friends profile pictures, and voice messages.
The app communicates with multiple ads and analytics services which collect personal in-
formation as follows. E.crashlytics.com collects smartphone device information and app
crash information, along with smartphone hardware ID, Google ads ID, and app installa-
tion ID. Api.branch.io collects smartphone device and OS information, Toymail user ID,
smartphone hardware ID, smartphone fingerprint ID, IP address, identity ID, and email
address. Api.branch.co verifies whether the smartphone is a real device or an emulator.
Wzrkt.com sets a unique ID for the user which it collects while the app is running, allow-
ing tracking the user across different sessions. It also collects the Google Ad ID (allowing
tracking the user across different services), smartphone device information, and telephone
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Toymail ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Wiggy Piggy Bank ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Hello Barbie ! ! ! ! !
Wowwee Chip ! ! !
Cloudpets ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
service carrier information. Api.segment.io collects Toymail user ID, name, email address,
device hardware ID, Google ads ID, smartphone device and OS information, data network
device status (WiFi, Bluetooth, cellular), and phone carrier name. None of these ads and
analytics servers respects the device-wide ad tracking setting, and all collect PII regardless
of whether it was disabled. Unsurprisingly, we found that using the toy resulted in targeted
ads even on different platforms by setting unique identifiers (e.g., identity ID) and correlat-
ing them with other personal information (e.g., email address), as shown in Figure 3 which
depicts a Toymail ad in a PC hosting Windows, on a different WiFi network.
Figure 3: Tracking example: Toymail tracking users across different platforms - Toymail
ad shown in a PC while the user is browsing Yahoo!
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Once the toy connects to the WiFi network, it communicates with
imp07a.boxen.electricimp.com to receive a list of allowed contacts. When the child
selects a contact and presses the message button, the toy begins recording. When the child
presses the message button again, the toy transmits the voice recording to the server, which
stores them in Amazon AWS storage. The toy keeps up to ten voice messages locally
which are received from parents and contacts. It also stores Toymail child ID, toy ID,
contacts’ names, and contacts’ Toymail IDs, in addition to WiFi SSID and password.
Security measures. The app connects to all servers over TLS. The app.toymailco.com
server certificate is signed by Go Daddy and uses a 2048-bit RSA key. The app maintains
its own list of strong cipher suites, and uses certificate pinning to prevent MitM attacks.
It stores hashes of the certificate chain public keys to bind the server certificate with the
original issuer. However, the toy suffers from a number of Insecure-TLS-practices. The
imp07a.boxen.electricimp.com server certificate is signed by the custom root CA impca,
and both certificates are sent to the toy. The server certificate is valid for 20 years and
it uses a 1024-bit RSA key whose certificate common name is different from the server’s
domain name. The toy uses a client certificate to authenticate to the server. It is signed
by impca, uses a 2048-bit RSA key, and is valid for 100 years. The app communicates
with two analytics and ads servers vulnerable to RC4 and POODLE attacks, with support
for SSL 3.0 and weak cipher suites, exposing Toymail to Exposure-to-vulnerable-third-
parties. Neither the session cookie expiration date nor secure flag are set, leaving the toy
vulnerable to Insecure-session-cookies.
Toymail is rated to offer Weak-parental-PII-control. When a child sends recordings to
54
contacts other than the parent, they are stored in the contact’s account, leaving the parent
without means to review or delete them. Even when a parent blocks a contact from the
child’s contact list, that contact can still access the child’s personal information. The server
sends the child’s personal information to the contact’s app accompanied by a “blocked” flag
(equal to “-1”) indicating that the recipient has been blocked. The app removes the entry
corresponding to the child from the app interface so they can no longer exchange voice
messages; however, the contact still receives the child’s personal information each time the
app is launched including: name, date of birth, photo, voice recording of the name, parent
Toymail ID, toy ID, wake up time, sleep time, and “isOnline” flag showing the state of the
toy.
With physical access to the toy, anyone can access these messages or even add contacts
to the contact list without authentication, making it vulnerable to No-local-PII-protection
and Unauthorized-config-physical, respectively. In fact, there is no mechanism to delete
locally stored voice recordings other than configuring the toy to use another account.
Toymail is designed to be Always-on. Switching off requires removing the batteries,
accessible only by removing the back cover using a screwdriver. Given that the toy in-
cludes sensitive devices like a microphone and is connected to the Internet, we deem this a
significant potential threat to children’s privacy and security.
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4.3.2 Wiggy Piggy Bank
PII collected and transmitted. The app communicates with the server api.kii.com, send-
ing parent login credentials (email address and password or session cookie), user ID, chil-
dren’s profile pictures, tasks set by parent, tasks completed by children, and children’s
goals. The app also communicates with ads and analytics services. Unity3d.com col-
lects an app ID, device unique ID, user ID, session ID, and device and OS information.
Moreover, even when ad tracking is disabled, unity3d.com still collects an advertising ID
uniquely identifying the user across different services, and app usage information including
app start time and duration. The app also connects to google-analytics.com, which collects
analytics data and applies obfuscation techniques before sending them.
Security measures. The app’s connection to api.kii.com appears to use TLS in a secure
way. The app relies on the OS trusted store to check the server certificate. The server
uses a certificate signed by well-known certificate authority (Go Daddy Secure Certificate
Authority - G2) and signed by a 2048-bit RSA key using SHA256. The server public
key uses a 2048-bit RSA key and the certificate is valid for a limited period (expiring in
October 2019). The server has six cipher suites that support forward secrecy and they are
at the top of the server’s cipher suites list. The server is patched against vulnerabilities
including POODLE and Heartbleed, Ticketbleed, and does not support TLS compression,
which causes vulnerabilities like CRIME. Although the app uses HTTPS to communicate
with the server api.kii.com, the server does not force using HTTPS in the case of flipping
HTTPS to HTTP, leaving all communication unencrypted, and making the toy vulnerable
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to Unencrypted-comm-channels. We use the Burp Suite repeater tool to flip all app requests
to the server on the fly to HTTP instead of HTTPS, and as a result, the app connects to the
HTTP version of the server and receives PII in plaintext.
A determined adversary can take over a parent’s account in several ways. The first
scenario is a result of Insecure-session-cookies. All session cookies expire January 19,
2038 - a long period of time during which any adversary who steals the cookies may use
them to access the parental account. In a second scenario, an Online-password-bruteforce
vulnerability allows an attacker to gain access to the parent’s account. This was verified by
using the Burp Suite intruder tool to brute force accounts owned by us. However, the most
serious vulnerability we uncovered, Unauthorized-config-nearby, enables an adversary to
access PII or assign tasks to a child simply by being within Bluetooth coverage. Anyone
within Bluetooth range can install the companion app, pair with the toy, and issue tasks,
both new and predefined. These new tasks would appear on the child’s account just as if
they had been assigned by the child’s parents. The toy announces predefined tasks in what
to the child is a familiar and trusted voice, increasing the likelihood that the child will fall
prey to the attack. The attacker may also add a valuable (but fake) reward to encourage the
child to perform the task. An adversary needs to take over the parent’s account (for instance
by brute forcing the parent’s password) to be able to assign new tasks to the child, but does
not need to do so to assign predefined tasks, including some that encourage the child to
leave the house like “pull the weeds”, “rake the leaves”, “take out the trash”, and “walk




PII collected and transmitted. The companion app transmits the following information
to api.2.toytalk.com: the smartphone manufacturer, device name and install ID (unique per
device), account ID (unique per user), app version, user consent flag, OS name, and OS
version (see also Table 8). The app also sends login information including email address
and password, as well as the child’s date of birth and any other important dates the parent
has specified. We did not observe traffic to any ads or analytics services. The toy does
not store the child’s voice recordings, but streams them directly to the cloud. The toy
stores the WiFi network SSID and passphrase, as well as the parent account ID that is used
to access the parent profile and listen to recordings. On the other hand, the app stores
sensitive information in plaintext, including a session cookie authenticating the user to the
toy server, the parent email address, and profile ID.
Security measures. The app does not rely on the OS CA store to verify the server cer-
tificate. The custom CA store, which is included in the app’s assets directory, contains
one certificate for “Toytalk ca”, a self-signed certificate used to sign the server certifi-
cate. In addition, the app uses a Bouncy Castle PKCS#12 certificate to authenticate to the
server. The app connects only to servers in its whitelist; at the time of testing, these were
test.2.toytalk.com and api.2.toytalk.com, although we did not observe any communication
with the first server, which seems to be for testing purposes. The app communicates with
api.2.toytalk.com over TLS using the OS TLS implementation, which may contain weak
cipher suites or vulnerable practices specifically in older OSes such as Android 4.4.
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There are several scenarios in which an adversary can exploit Insecure-TLS-practices
to steal the parent’s credentials and access the child’s recordings. The client, server, and
self-signed root certificates use RSA with 1024-bit keys which are being phased out [10].
The server certificate private key can be used to decrypt the negotiated session key, and
the root CA key can be used to sign certificates as api.2.toytalk.com to steal the parent’s
credentials.
The toy communicates with three servers: firmware.toytalk.com, puppeteer.toytalk.com,
and storage.toytalk.com. When Hello Barbie is switched on, it connects to the WiFi net-
work and initiates a connection to firmware.toytalk.com over TLS. While the child presses
and holds the “talk” button, Hello Barbie streams the child’s speech over a TLS-protected
channel to puppeteer.toytalk.com. Once the “talk” button is released, puppeteer.toytalk.com
sends the link to the new recording to storage.toytalk.com, where it is stored. Analy-
sis of the three servers shows that two of them, namely firmware.toytalk.com and stor-
age.toytalk.com, support weak cipher suites (TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
with TLS 1.0). Bhargavan et al. [18] found that ciphers using 64-bit blocks (e.g., 3DES)
are vulnerable to secret key disclosure.
The official website toytalk.com can be used by parents to review the child’s recordings.
The server certificate uses an RSA 2048-bit key and is signed by Amazon using SHA256
and an RSA 2048-bit key. The server does not support weak cipher suites and uses cryp-
tographic libraries patched against known cryptographic attacks. However, there is no
restriction on the number of login attempts, and the login can be bruteforced. We exploited
this Online-password-bruteforce vulnerability during the course of testing to bruteforce our
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own account. This flaw was originally reported in January 2016 [82] and our experiments
show that it is still not fixed.
To investigate communication between the toy and the app, we use the following spe-
cific setup for Hello Barbie. We use two WiFi adapters on our test machine, one in AP
mode as an impostor Hello Barbie, and the second to connect to the real Hello Barbie,
exploiting its unprotected hotspot. We route all traffic from the impostor to the real toy.
In the app, both toys, real and impostor, are listed, and we connect to the impostor. The
smartphone hosting the app, meanwhile, is configured to forward all traffic through a Burp
Suite proxy. This configuration requires the app to be patched to accept certificates signed
by Burp Suite CA, and the app client certificate bundle added to Burp Suite as the client
certificate. This allows the app to authenticate itself to the toy, enabling us to intercept
communication between them. The toy authenticates to the app using a certificate issued
to 192.168.10.1, signed by “ToyTalk CA”, and valid to 2030. Once the TLS handshake
is complete, the app sends the parent account ID and WiFi configuration, including WiFi
SSID and password, to the toy.
The toy can be configured using any companion app, and no parent authentication is
required to pair with the toy. Because the toy uses the parent’s account ID as the sole way
to relate the child’s profile, including voice recordings, to the parent, an adversary need
only reconfigure the toy to use the adversary’s account to access all subsequent recordings
made by the child.
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There are several scenarios in which the toy is vulnerable to Unauthorized-config-
nearby. In the first scenario, an adversary who knows the WiFi credentials can config-
ure the toy with their account ID; in the others, the adversary does not require the WiFi
credentials. While the toy is in pairing mode, it broadcasts an open network with SSID
“Barbie-950”, making it temporarily vulnerable to Unencrypted-hotspot. An unencrypted
hotspot could allow an adversary to conduct ARP spoofing, assuming a MitM position be-
tween the app and the toy. In this scenario, the legitimate toy and the app will unwittingly
treat the adversary as the destination for all traffic, allowing the adversary to sniff the par-
ent account ID and the WiFi credentials. We deem this a minor risk as the vulnerability is
only present for a limited duration (during pairing), and an attacker must be within close
proximity. However, the toy can be accidentally put in pairing mode during the course of
normal play, as it requires the child to simultaneously press two easily accessible buttons
on the toy. Once it is in pairing mode, an adversary within wireless range can download
the app, configure the toy to connect to a different WiFi network under their control, and
then configure it to use the adversary’s account.
4.3.4 Wowwee Chip
PII collected and transmitted. The Wowwee Chip companion app sends analytics and
bug-related data to Flurry Analytics and Crashlytics. Flurry Analytics collects a hardware
unique ID and ad ID, as well as toy usage information, smartphone and OS information,
telephone carrier information, approximate location, and smartphone state information in-
cluding battery remaining percentage, battery charging state, memory available, external
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and internal disk sizes and available spaces. Crashlytics collects ad ID, app installation ID,
and smartphone device information, in addition to other obfuscated data.
Security measures. Wowwee Chip adopts strong TLS practices. The app does not use TLS
1.0, and the servers are patched against POODLE, Downgrade, and Heartbleed attacks.
Wowwee Chip is not vulnerable to CRIME since data compression is not supported in
the app or the servers. The app uses its own list of cipher suites which does not contain
weak ciphers or short keys, and it supports only TLS version 1.2. All cipher suites support
forward secrecy. Flurry Analytics and Crashlytics certificates use RSA 2048-bit, and are
issued by well-known issuers with secure signature algorithms. Certificates validity periods
are limited, and they are not revoked. Although both servers support TLS 1.0 and a weak
cipher suite (TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA112), since they are not supported
by the app, we consider the app not to suffer from Insecure-TLS-practices.
On the other hand, Wowwee Chip is vulnerable to No-local-PII-protection. All compo-
nents of the toy can be paired with the RamBLE utility without authentication, allowing us
to access and modify toy information that includes manufacturer name, model number, se-
rial number, firmware revision and battery level. An adversary could also modify the name
of the toy to something inappropriate, which would appear in the app when the child or
parent uses it to play with the toy. Figure 4 shows the Wowwee Chip app displaying a ma-
liciously altered toy name. The toy and all its companion components (Smart Bed, Smart
Ball, Smart Band) use static Bluetooth MAC addresses that allow child tracking, leaving
it vulnerable to Insecure-Bluetooth-practice. It is likewise vulnerable to Unauthorized-use
since the connection between the companion app and the toy is over unencrypted BLE.
62
Figure 4: Maliciously changing Wowwee Chip’s name
Any installed instance of the app can pair with the toy and have access to full toy function-
ality. A child can play with Wowwee Chip directly without the need for an app, leaving the
toy available for Bluetooth pairing. This could be exploited maliciously if an adversary is
within Bluetooth range (about 33 metres). Such an adversary could control the toy, navi-
gating it and making it perform activities such as Yoga or Wanna Play that could injure a
child, especially taking into account the weight of the toy at 2.7 kg. An adversary could
also make the toy bark continuously by adjusting the wake up alarm, possibly scaring the
child.
4.3.5 Cloudpets
PII collected and transmitted. The Cloudpets companion app connects to the server
parse-cloudpets.spiraltoys.com and transmits parent and child names, pictures, and dates
of birth; parent email address; friend names and profile photos; and child voice mes-
sages, which are stored in the parent account in the cloud. It connects to ads and analyt-
ics servers which collect PII as follows. Googleads.g.doubleclick.net sets DSID and IDE
cookies, which link user activity and feature targeted ads across different platforms [7].
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Ads.mopub.com collects the unique device identifier and sends it after hashing using SHA-
1. The app also connects to googleadservices.com and googlesyndication.com, which ini-
tiate requests to googleads.g.doubleclick.net. The Cloudpets companion app sends these
unique identifiers even if the user disables ad tracking.
Security measures. The toy server suffers from Insecure-TLS-practices. It supports only
TLS 1.0, and several anonymous cipher suites (e.g. TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_-
SHA) which allow accessing the server without authentication and expose the app-server
connection to the risk of MitM attacks. Moreover, the server is vulnerable to RC4, and uses
weak key exchange and common DH primes, increasing the risk of losing forward secrecy
for transmitted PII.
PII stored remotely, including audio files and photos, can’t be accessed without au-
thentication. All PII is transmitted over encrypted channel; however, the server does not
force using HTTPS. Flipping HTTPS to HTTP sends PII in plaintext, exposing the toy to
the Unencrypted-comm-channels vulnerability. The toy suffers from Insecure-Bluetooth-
practice as it uses a static MAC address and it does not apply BLE privacy; a MitM could
access communication between the app and the toy.
The app displays ads that cover the entire screen at app launch and periodically during
use; some of them force users to wait for several seconds before allowing them to close
the ads. Moreover, the app features a persistent ad bar at the bottom or top of the interface
which continuously displays ads to the user. While many free standalone smartphone apps
are monetized through ads, it is unusual to observe aggressive (or any) ad display in the




In this chapter, we examine the security and privacy practices of five popular smart toys on
the market. Our findings show widespread use of data collection by toy makers and third
party analytics servers, with almost all toys embedding analytics services within their apps,
and many of them transmitting advertising identifiers even when ad tracking is disabled
by the user. Many toys do not take adequate measures to protect sensitive data, and some
toys do not protect locally stored PII at all, making it trivially accessible to anyone with
physical access. Children’s physical privacy may also be compromised, as all Bluetooth-
capable toys we examine advertise a static MAC address, making it possible to track them
through physical space. Finally, several toys are vulnerable to exploits that can result in




Conclusion and Future Work
To conclude, we presented two frameworks to analyze security and privacy practices of
smart toys. The first framework is analytical and we used it to evaluate privacy practices of
a representative set of 11 smart toys and their companion apps by analyzing their privacy
policies and terms of use documentation. We highlighted several concerns in the privacy
practices of these smart toys regarding PII collection, third-party data sharing, web track-
ing, and data storage location. Moreover, static analysis for the companion apps reveals
that some toys’ companion apps are over-privileged, others collect unnecessary personal
information, and some of them get involved in suspicious activities such as abusing the
telephony service. In our second framework, we investigated the security and privacy prac-
tices of five popular smart toys using our experimental setup. Our analysis shows excessive
data collection by toys and third parity analytics servers and many of the toys transmit users
unique identifiers even if ad tracking is disabled by the user. We also noticed that many toys
do not use proper security measures to protect the collected private information. Several
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toys are vulnerable to exploits that can allow adversaries to take over control of the toy in
a way that can cause potential harm for the children.
5.1 Recommendations and Best Practices
Just as manufacturers of traditional toys must follow mandated safety standards, smart toy
makers should additionally adhere to security and privacy guidelines [63]. Based on the
experience gained throughout this research, in here, we list some recommendations for
makers of connected toys.
5.1.1 Security-Related Practices
Toys and companion apps must use a custom list of strong (or at least not weak) cipher
suites and recent TLS versions (e.g., TLS 1.2) to avoid attacks including Beast and POO-
DLE. Servers also are recommended to be patched against known TLS protocol vulnera-
bilities including POODLE, Downgrade, RC4, Heartbleed, and Ticketbleed vulnerabilities.
Wherever possible, host whitelisting should be used, hard coded in the smart toy firmware
and the companion app, as it can mitigate against phishing attacks. Certificate pinning
can also help prevent MitM attacks. Toys with wireless capabilities should take particular
care to secure pairing and connection. If the toy uses Bluetooth, it should use encryption.
Using open Bluetooth can allow unauthorized access to the toy and PII stored on it. Toys
should also use dynamic Bluetooth MAC addresses to avoid the possibility of tracking chil-
dren’s locations. WiFi-enabled toys should be provisioned in a secure manner, with WiFi
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credentials supplied securely over an out-of-band channel. Moreover, toys manufacturers
should properly mention security measures that have been taken to protect the collected
information in the legally-binding documentation.
5.1.2 Privacy-Related Practices
Toys manufacturers should provide complete information about data storage location and
legal compliance. They should also restrict information collection to those that are needed
for the purpose of the toy functionality (unnecessary collection of privacy-sensitive infor-
mation can pose questions about the intention of collecting these sensitive information).
In all cases, smart toys companies must document personal information they collect in the
privacy policy or terms of use documentation. Toys should not store personal information
(e.g., voice recordings, photos, videos, personal information that identify users/children)
internally on the toy’s flash memory; if it is necessary for toy functionality, then they should
be stored encrypted. Transmission of personal information should always occur over secure
communication channels.
Toy manufacturers that provide links to PII, such as voice recordings, should also grant
parents the ability to select whether the PII is public or private. Even when links are ran-
domly generated, if they are sufficient to access PII then we deem it a threat to privacy. We
also recommend allowing a default setting the parent can configure to determine whether
such links are public or private. Moreover, parent control should be provided to allow
parents to review or delete collected personal information by the toy and its companion
app. Toys manufactures should also provide parents with a dedicated privacy support via
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an email address or a specific web page.
In addition, companion apps should not be over-privileged (i.e., more permissions de-
clared in the Manifest than the app needed or used). Over-privileged apps can pose privacy
risks, as they may request extraneous permissions, which can be used to access sensitive
information. We strongly caution against ad display in companion apps, especially as these
apps form part of a purchased toy and thus should not require support through ad revenue.
In addition, ads and analytics services should be used sparingly with children [15], and
when used, should respect users’ request to disable ad tracking. Specifically, we observed
multiple instances of Android apps flouting the user’s preferred ad tracking setting, and
sending the ad identifier regardless of whether it was disabled. In the Android model, a
single system call returns both the ad identifier and the limit ad tracking setting, and the
developer is assumed to not abuse them [1].
5.2 Future work
In what follows, we provide a summary of some possible future work directions:
 Firmware analysis: Firmware analysis may show whether toys store personal in-
formation locally on the toy and if the information is encrypted or in plaintext, an
important consideration especially for used or lost toys. Firmware analysis may also
help determine whether the firmware can be modified maliciously, such as to estab-
lish rogue connections with an adversary.
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 Our analytical framework for analyzing privacy polices and terms of use documen-
tation need to be automated for better scalability (as opposed to our current manual
static analysis).
 It is useful to create an experimental setup that can examine companion iOS apps
and provide a comparison between security and privacy practices in case of using




We investigate a wide spectrum of toys available on the market, varying by target age
range and functionality. The toys we selected span multiple target ages, from Hello Barbie
and Smart Toy Monkey, geared towards younger audiences, to what are generally thought
of as STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math) toys aimed at children 8+,
such as Sphero BB-8, and Anki Cozmo. Toy functionality encompasses AI capability,
such as voice and image recognition; sensors, like mic and camera; mobility; and wireless
communication, like WiFi and Bluetooth. These toys are described below.
Toymail allows children to exchange voice messages with parents, relatives and friends
using the companion app or another Toymail. Parents can configure the toy with an ap-
proved list of contacts. Voice alerts notify children when they have new messages, and they
can click the play button to listen.
Wiggy Piggy Bank is a Bluetooth-connected toy that allows parents to set tasks, create
goals, and send rewards to their children through a companion app. Children are notified
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they have new tasks either by the toy, which gives alerts and states the tasks, or by checking
their accounts through the app. Children confirm through the app that they have completed
a task, and upon parental approval virtual funds are transfered to their account. A child can
set goals (e.g., buying a mobile phone for $100). When the balance of the child’s virtual
account achieves the target value of the goal, the child may redeem it from the parent.
Hello Barbie is a smart doll designed to conduct interactive conversations with a child.
The toy connects to the Internet directly to send the child’s voice recordings to the toy
server, which applies voice recognition techniques to respond to the child. The toy has a
companion app that a parent can use to configure the toy.
Sphero BB-8 is a Star Wars character-branded spherical robot that can be remotely pi-
loted via a companion app. The Sphero BB-8 is one of a line of spherical robots designed
for both recreational and educational use. It can be controlled programmatically using the
beginner-friendly Sphero SPRK Lightning Lab smartphone app, or a variety of both offi-
cial and unofficial SDKs for multiple platforms. The toy features an on-board gyroscope
and accelerometer, and is designed to be controlled by compatible BLE-enabled devices.
Although Sphero BB-8 has been designed to be controlled in a variety of ways, includ-
ing programmatically, our study focused primarily on the most common (and, to a child,
intuitive) scenario: running the companion Sphero BB-8 app on a smartphone.
Anki Cozmo is an intelligent programmable bot with onboard speaker, camera, and
inbuilt facial recognition.Anki Cozmo sings, plays games and observes its surroundings.
The toy comes with 3 programmable, LED-colored cubes. It is interactive, and can be
played with using a companion app, or programmed via a Python-based SDK, available on
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GitHub.
Smart Toy Monkey is one of a related line of Smart Toys by Fisher Price. The toy is
interactive, featuring a microphone, speaker, and voice recognition, and an accelerometer
that detects if it is being thrown in the air. The toy has limited image recognition, mainly
for use with accompanying activity cards that can be used in lieu of the companion app.
Wowwee Chip is a robot dog that responds to voice commands and touch. Wowwee
Chip comes with a Smart Ball and Smart Bed that doubles as a charging dock, and responds
to commands from a companion watch called a Smart Band or the Wowwee Chipmobile
app.
Cloudpets allows exchanging voice messages between children, parents, and friends.
The toy does not connect to the Internet directly, but connects to a companion app through
Bluetooth. A parent uses the app to create parent and child accounts, and links the toy to
the child’s account. The toy receives a link request, appearing as red heart pulses; pressing
a button on the toy’s hand accepts the connection. Through the parent account, parents can
accept or reject messages sent to or from the toy.
CogniToys Dino: Powered by IBM Watson and Friendgine technology, CogniToys Dino
can interact with children by telling stories, make them laugh by cracking jokes and playing
games.
Edwin the Duck: A toy duck that tells interactive stories, sings and plays stimulating
games via the companion app.
My Friend Cayla: A doll that utilizes speech recognition technology and Internet con-
nectivity to answer questions on various topics.
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I-Que Robot: An intelligent robot that responds to queries, dances on music and allows
children to have real-time conversations with the toy.
Zenbo: A smart robot that can roam around the house taking photos, making video calls
and playing songs. It can tell entertaining stories to children.
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Appendix B
Smart Toys Privacy Policy Links
Table 10 shows links to the toys’ privacy policies and terms of use documentation.
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Table 10: Links to toys’ privacy policies and terms of use
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